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ABSTRACT 
The words of a language reflect the structure of the human mind, allowing us to transmit thoughts 
between individuals. However, language can represent only a subset of our rich and detailed cog-
nitive architecture. Here, we ask what kinds of common knowledge (semantic memory) are cap-
tured by word meanings (lexical semantics). We examine a prominent computational model that 
represents words as vectors in a multidimensional space, such that proximity between word-
vectors approximates semantic relatedness. Because related words appear in similar contexts, such 
spaces – called “word embeddings” – can be learned from patterns of lexical co-occurrences in 
natural language. Despite their popularity, a fundamental concern about word embeddings is that 
they appear to be semantically “rigid”: inter-word proximity captures only overall similarity, yet 
human judgments about object similarities are highly context-dependent and involve multiple, dis-
tinct semantic features. For example, dolphins and alligators appear similar in size, but differ in in-
telligence and aggressiveness. Could such context-dependent relationships be recovered from 
word embeddings? To address this issue, we introduce a powerful, domain-general solution: “se-
mantic projection” of word-vectors onto lines that represent various object features, like size (the 
line extending from the word “small” to “big”), intelligence (“dumb” → “smart”), or danger 
(“safe” → “dangerous”). This method, which is intuitively analogous to placing objects “on a 
mental scale” between two extremes, recovers human judgments across a range of object catego-
ries and properties. We thus show that word embeddings inherit a wealth of common knowledge 
from word co-occurrence statistics and can be flexibly manipulated to express context-dependent 
meanings. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When we say that we “know the meaning” of a word, what kind of knowledge do we mean we have? Words allow 
us to communicate the content of one human mind to another human mind: they are representations of mental struc-
tures. More precisely, we use words to express concepts (Marr, 1982). Concepts organize our knowledge about 
regularities in the world – they are generalizations about the kinds of things that exist and the properties that they 
have. Words, in turn, associate such abstract knowledge with surface forms of sounds/letters, and differences be-
tween word meanings correspond to distinctions that we can make between things in the world (Goldberg, 1995; 
Jackendoff, 2002; Murphy, 2004). Consequently, the psycholinguistic study of word meanings in the mental lexicon 
(lexical semantics; e.g., Steinberg and Jakobovits, 1971; Richards, 1982; Pinker and Levin, 1991) is tightly linked to 
the cognitive study of the architecture of world knowledge in the human mind (semantic memory; Quillian, 1966; 
Tulving, 1972). 
                                     
1 Department of Computer Science, Harvard University (ggrand@college.harvard.edu) 
2 McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
3 Medical Imaging Technologies, Siemens Healthineers  
4 Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital (evelina.fedorenko@mgh.harvard.edu) 
5 Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School 
* Equal contribution 
† Corresponding author 
ar
X
iv
: 1
80
2.
01
24
1v
2 
[c
s.C
L]
 6
 M
ar
 2
01
8 
  2 
However, our world knowledge is broad, detailed and complex. Even an intuitively simple concept like DOG cap-
tures rich information about the animal it refers to, e.g., its appearance, biological properties, behavioral tendencies, 
cultural roles, etc. However, only a subset of this conceptual knowledge is communicated by the word “dog” (for a 
review, see Gleitman and Papafragou, 2013). Therefore, any theory of lexical semantics should specify the kinds of 
world knowledge that are captured in the lexicon. Yet constructing such a theory based on behavioral studies of lan-
guage processing is challenging: it requires a paradigm for probing only that subset of conceptual distinctions that 
constitutes the (lexical) semantics of the word “dog” without also activating the rest of our world knowledge that is 
captured by the concept DOG. 
Fortunately, a new insight into this problem is offered by computational methods that approximate a dissociation 
between lexical semantics and the rest of semantic memory: by granting a machine access only to word-forms, with 
no a-priori concepts, one can probe the semantic distinctions that are—in principle—available from the statistics of 
natural language alone. This approach relies on a hypothesis that dates back to the origins of modern linguistics, 
namely, that word meanings are determined by their patterns of usage, i.e., by the words they tend to appear with 
(De Saussure, 1916/2011; Wittgenstein, 1953/2010; Harris, 1954; Firth, 1957; Miller and Charles, 1991; for a 
review, see Sahlgren, 2008). Specifically, by tracking the distribution of word co-occurrences in multi-billion word 
corpora, unsupervised algorithms can learn a representation of word meanings as vectors in a multidimensional 
space where the proximity between these vectors increases with the co-occurrence probability of the corresponding 
words. The resulting space is called a “word embedding” or a “distributional semantic model” (for reviews, see 
Lenci, 2008; Turney and Pantel, 2010; Erk, 2012; Pereira et al., 2013; Baroni et al., 2014; Clark, 2015) (Bengio et 
al., 2003; Collobert et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012).  
Recent research has shown that inter-word distances in word embeddings correlate with human ratings of semantic 
similarity (Mikolov et al., 2013; Pennington et al., 2014). Furthermore, these distances are geometrically consistent 
across different word pairs that share a common semantic relation. For instance, the location of 𝑚𝑎𝑛 relative to 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛 is similar to the location of 𝑘𝚤𝑛𝑔 relative to 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑛; This consistency allows for geometric operations to 
simulate conceptual relations, e.g., 𝑘𝚤𝑛𝑔 −𝑚𝑎𝑛 + 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛 ≈ 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑛 (Levy and Goldberg, 2014). These results 
demonstrate that, by simply tracking co-occurrence statistics, a machine with no a-priori concepts can obtain a lexi-
con that contains certain kinds of semantic memory.  
Despite these impressive capabilities, word embeddings appear to have a fundamental limitation: the proximity be-
tween any two word-vectors captures only a single, semantically “rigid” measure of overall similarity. In contrast, 
humans evaluate the conceptual similarity between items in semantic memory flexibly, in a context-dependent man-
ner. Consider, for example, our knowledge of dolphins and alligators: when we compare the two on a scale of size, 
from “small” to “big”, they are relatively similar; in terms of their intelligence—on a scale from “dumb” to 
“smart”—they are somewhat different; and in terms of danger to us—on a scale from “safe” to “dangerous”—they 
differ significantly. Can such distinct, multiple relationships be inferred from word co-occurrence statistics? If so, 
how is such complex knowledge expressed in a word embedding? 
Here, we suggest that such conceptual knowledge is implicitly embedded in the structure of word embeddings and 
we introduce a powerful, domain-general solution for extracting it: “semantic projection” of word-vectors onto “se-
mantic subspaces” that represent different features. For instance, to recover the similarities in size among nouns in a 
certain category (e.g., animals), we project their representations onto the line that extends from the word-vector 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 to the word-vector 𝑏𝚤𝑔; to compare their levels of intelligence, we project them on the line connecting 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑏 
and 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡; and to order them according to how dangerous they are, we project them onto the line connecting 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 
and 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑠 (for an animation of this procedure, see: Animated Semantic Projection Demo). We demonstrate 
that the resulting feature-wise (“context-dependent”) similarities robustly predict human judgments across a wide 
range of everyday object categories and semantic features. These results provide evidence that rich conceptual 
knowledge can be extracted bottom-up from the statistics of natural language, and it can be readily recovered from 
word embeddings with a simple and elegant method. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Our experiment tested whether semantic projection (section 2.2.2) could recover context-dependent conceptual 
knowledge. To operationalize context-dependent knowledge, objects from a certain semantic category (e.g., ani-
mals) were rated based on different semantic features (e.g., size, intelligence, or danger). Namely, we chose several 
object categories along with semantic features that characterized them (section 2.1) and evaluated the ratings of cat-
egory items along each feature in two ways: by collecting such ratings from humans, and via semantic projection in 
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a word embedding that was created with Global Vectors for Word Representation (GloVe; Pennington et al., 2014). 
Our test then compared these two sets of feature-specific ratings. 
2.1. SEMANTIC CATEGORIES AND FEATURES 
We created a dataset of categories and features that met four criteria: (i) each category consisted of concrete ob-
jects/entities; (ii) each category was semantically associated with several features (to evaluate whether semantic pro-
jection generalized across features); (iii) each feature was semantically associated with several categories (to evalu-
ate whether semantic projection generalized across categories); (iv) categories and features spanned diverse aspects 
of everyday semantic knowledge. All categories and their constituent items were selected from an extensive set of 
nouns, generated for a large-scale study on lexical memory (Mahowald et al., 2014). 
2.1.1. CATEGORIES 
Our dataset consisted of 9 semantic categories: animals, clothing, professions, weather phenomena, sports, mytho-
logical creatures, world cities, US states, and first names. These categories have been used in feature-elicitation 
studies, with varying degrees of prevalence (Paivio et al., 1968; Battig and Montague, 1969; Cree and McRae, 2003; 
McRae et al., 2005; Pereira et al., 2013; Binder et al., 2016): the first four have been frequently used; the next two—
less frequently; and the last three have been rarely used but, unlike the other categories, consisted of proper nouns 
and, moreover, shared some features with the other categories. Items in all categories were used as cues in the word-
association study of Nelson et al. (2004).6 
Most categories consisted of 50 representative items (e.g., the clothing category contained words like “hat,” “tuxe-
do,” “sandals,” and “skirt”; the full dataset is reproduced in the Appendix). The only exceptions were the categories 
of animals, which consisted of 34 items; weather, which consisted of 37 items; and professions, which consisted of 
49 items. In order to ensure that items were representative of their respective categories, we chose within each cate-
gory the 50 most frequent nouns according to the SubtlexUS Word Frequency Database (Brysbaert and New, 2009) 
(candidate items consisted of all the relevant nouns from Mahowald et al., 2014). We discarded multi-word expres-
sions (except for US States, e.g., “North-Dakota”) and words that did not appear in the vocabulary of the word em-
bedding (section 2.2.1).  
For two categories, additional selection criteria were used in order to increase the variability for the “gender” fea-
ture: for the first names category, we chose the 20 most common male names, 20 most common female names, and 
10 most common unisex names from the past 100 years, based on public data from the US Social Security Admin-
istration.7 For the professions category, efforts were made to balance the items by gender, because the majority of 
the most frequently occurring profession names were traditionally male. 
2.1.2. FEATURES 
Our dataset included 17 semantic features, each associated with a subset of the categories above: size, temperature, 
valence, loudness, speed, location, intelligence, wetness, weight, wealth, gender, danger, age, religiosity, political 
leaning, cost and arousal. These features have been produced in feature-elicitation studies with varying degrees of 
prevalence (Cree and McRae, 2003; McRae et al., 2005; Binder et al., 2016): the first four—almost invariably; the 
next three—frequently; the next six—less frequently; and the last four—very rarely. Words describing possible val-
ues of all features (e.g., “big” and “small” for the size feature), were used as cues in the word-association study of 
Nelson et al. (2004).  
2.1.3. CHOOSING APPROPRIATE FEATURES FOR EACH CATEGORY 
For each category in our dataset, only some features provided meaningful contexts for rating category members; for 
instance, sports could be rated by “danger”, but not by “size”, and names could be rated by “gender”, but not “tem-
perature”. Therefore, out of the set of 9×17 = 153 category/feature pairings, we first selected a subset of 45 pairs that 
appeared intuitively appropriate. Then, to ensure that no appropriate pairs were mistakenly excluded, we collected 
human judgments about the relevance of each feature for each category. Specifically, we asked participants (n=50) 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, www.mturk.com; see Buhrmester et al., 2011) to rate how likely they were to 
describe each category (e.g., animals) in terms of each feature (e.g., size). Instead of using feature names, we used 
                                     
6 http://w3.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/ 
7 http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/century.html; https://www.github.com/fivethirtyeight/data/tree/ 
master/unisex-names 
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antonyms that represented opposite extreme values of that feature; for instance, a typical question read “How likely 
are you to describe animals as large/big/huge or small/little/tiny?”. Ratings of the 153 category/feature pairs were 
made on a scale from 1 (“not likely at all”) to 5 (“extremely likely”). 
We averaged the ratings of each category/feature pair across participants. Out of the 153 pairs, we selected those for 
which the mean rating exceeded the 75th percentile (corresponding to a mean rating of 3.44 or above on the likeli-
hood scale). This subset included 39 pairs. We removed two pairs where the norming question was misunderstood 
due to its ambiguous phrasing: animals-age (we are likely to describe an animal as being young or old, but compar-
ing different species in terms of their age is less meaningful), and cities-political (we are likely to describe US cities 
as being democratic or republican, but many items included in this category for the main experiment were cities in 
other countries). 
The remaining subset of 37 pairs partially overlapped with the manually pre-selected subset (27 pairs in common). 
We took the union of these two subsets to obtain a set of 56 pairs used in the main experiment. We note that the in-
clusion of pre-selected pairs that were not rated highly in the norming study could only weaken the performance of 
semantic projection: if semantic knowledge about these “unlikely” category/feature pairs is noisy or uncertain, we 
do not expect to recover it from a distributed semantic model (DSM) via semantic projection. In section 2.3, we de-
scribe how we measured this uncertainty in human knowledge (this resulted in the removal of 4 category/feature 
pairs for which such knowledge was extremely noisy). 
2.2. SEMANTIC PROJECTION 
2.2.1. THE GLOVE WORD EMBEDDING 
We chose to conduct our experiment in the GloVe word embedding (Pennington et al., 2014), because it outperforms 
several other word embeddings in predicting word similarity judgments (Pereira et al., 2016). We used 300-
dimensional GloVe vectors derived from the Common Crawl corpus, which contains approximately 42 billion un-
cased tokens and a total vocabulary size of 1.9 million.8 In order to limit the vocabulary to words with robust co-
occurrence estimates, we considered only the 500K most frequent words. 
2.2.2. THE RATIONALE OF SEMANTIC PROJECTION 
Semantic projection is a domain-general method for comparing word-vectors in the context of a certain semantic 
feature. A guiding example for applying this method in a simplified, three-dimensional GloVe space (for illustrative 
purposes) is depicted in Figure 1 for the category “animals” and the feature “size”. Intuitively, to compare animals 
in terms of this feature, we construct a scale—i.e., a straight line in GloVe space—on which animals could be or-
dered according to their size (the red line in Figure 1). This scale is constructed via a simple heuristic: we draw a 
line between antonyms—e.g., the word-vector 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 and the word-vector 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒—that denote opposite values of the 
feature “size” (in Figure 1, these two word-vectors are denoted by red circles). This heuristic corresponds to taking 
a vector difference: "𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒" = 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 (we use quotation marks to distinguish between our scale, obtained by 
subtracting two word-vectors, and the vector of the lexical entry 𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒). Then, by projecting word-vectors of different 
animals onto this scale, we can approximate common knowledge about their relative sizes. For example, to estimate 
the relative size of a horse, we would compute the inner product ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∙ "𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒" (in Figure 1, this orthogonal projec-
tion is represented by the blue line extending from the blue dot of ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 to the red scale of "𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒"). 
The scale thus created is a one-dimensional subspace in which the feature “size” governs similarity patterns between 
word-vectors such that, for example, ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 and 𝑡𝚤𝑔𝑒𝑟 are located close to each other because they are relatively 
similar in size (in Figure 1 these two word-vectors, denoted by blue circles, map onto nearby locations on the red 
line denoting the scale). Critically, these size-related similarity patterns might be different from the global similari-
ties in the original space where, e.g., ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 and 𝑡𝚤𝑔𝑒𝑟 might be farther apart: despite their similarity in size (and 
other features), horses are perceived to be much less dangerous than tigers, they belong to a different taxonomic 
order, occupy different habitats, etc. (in Figure 1, the blue circle corresponding to ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 is relatively far from that 
of 𝑡𝚤𝑔𝑒𝑟, which happens to be closer to 𝑟ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑜 and 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝚤𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟). 
                                     
8 https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/; https://www.commoncrawl.org/ 
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of semantic projection. Word-vectors in the category “animals” 
(blue circles) are orthogonally projected (light blue lines) onto the feature subspace for “size” (red 
line), define as the vector difference between 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 and 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 (red circles). Dimensions are arbi-
trary and were chosen via Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to enhance visualization (the orig-
inal GloVe word embedding has 300 dimensions). For an animated version of this figure, see: An-
imated Semantic Projection Demo. 
Note that “size” is a semantic feature that applies to numerous categories of concrete objects: not only animals, but 
also mythological creatures, world cities, US states, etc. For each such category, its members could be projected 
onto the same size-scale described above. Hence, semantic projection on a “feature-subspace” is a domain-general 
method. In this article, we limit ourselves to semantic features that can be represented by one-dimensional subspaces 
(“scales”). However, other feature-subspaces for other semantic features could be of higher dimensionality (see Dis-
cussion). 
2.2.3. DEFINING FEATURE SUBSPACES  
A 1D feature subspace is approximated by the vector difference between antonyms that represent opposite ends of 
the feature continuum. Here, each end was represented not by a single word but, rather, by 3 words similar in mean-
ing; the feature subspace was then defined as the average of the 3×3 = 9 possible vector differences (or “lines”) be-
tween the two ends. For instance, the feature subspace "𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒" was the average of the pairwise lines between 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,  𝑏𝚤𝑔, ℎ𝑢𝑔𝑒  and 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,  𝑙𝚤𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒, 𝑡𝚤𝑛𝑦 . This averaging procedure was chosen in order to obtain more robust 
approximations of feature subspaces that were not strongly impacted by the particular choice of antonyms. Indeed, 
lines for a given feature subspace were not strongly aligned, with the mean cosine similarity between one line and 
the average of the remaining eight being 0.533, corresponding to an angle of 0.99π (57 degrees). Nevertheless, lines 
were still more aligned within a feature subspace than across subspaces: the mean cosine similarity between one line 
and the average of lines from another subspace was 0.095, corresponding to an angle of 1.47π (84.5 degrees). 
2.3. EVALUATING SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE FROM HUMAN JUDGMENTS 
Common knowledge about the 56 category/feature pairs in our dataset was evaluated via MTurk experiments, or 
“human information tasks” (HITs). These HITs were designed to be approximately 5 minutes long, and participants 
were paid $0.50 per HIT. In each HIT, n=25 participants rated the items in a single category according to a single 
feature. Each item had a separate sliding scale from 0 to 100, where 0 corresponded to a weak value of the feature 
(e.g., “small, little, or tiny” for size; “safe, harmless, or calm” for danger) and 100 corresponded to a strong value of 
the feature (e.g., “large, big, or huge” for “size”; “dangerous, deadly, or threatening” for danger). The words describ-
ing each end of the scale were the same words that we used to define the feature subspaces in the GloVe space.  
In order to obtain data of high quality, we limited participation to MTurk users in the United Stated who had previ-
ously completed at least 1000 HITs with an acceptance rate of 95% or above. To account for participant idiosyncra-
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sies in the range of values used, we z-scored the ratings of each participant. To exclude participants who had rushed 
to complete their HIT or had otherwise provided random responses, we computed Pearson’s moment correlation 
coefficient between the scaled responses of each participant and the average of the scaled responses across the rest 
of the sample. For each HIT, this procedure thus resulted in 25 inter-subject correlation values (IS-rs). The IS-rs for 
each HIT were Fisher-transformed in order to improve the normality of their distribution (Silver and Dunlap, 1987), 
and participants whose IS-r exceeded the mean IS-r in their sample by more than 2.5 standard deviations (i.e., partic-
ipants whose ratings showed weak correlations with the rest of the group) were removed from further analysis. In 
the majority of HITs, no participants were excluded, and no more than 2 participants were excluded from any given 
HIT. 
For a given category/feature pair, the average IS-r across participants—a measure of inter-rater reliability—provides 
a measure of the noise/uncertainty in common knowledge about that pair. Therefore, this measure estimates an up-
per bound for the fit between semantic projections and human data (section 2.4.2). When examining the average IS-r 
for each experiment, we identified four outlier experiments for which inter-rater reliability was very low (IS-r<0.07): 
cities by temperature, cities by wealth, clothing by arousal, and clothing by size. The IS-r values for these four ex-
periments were clearly separate from the distribution of IS-r values across the remaining 52 experiments and, ac-
cordingly, we decided to remove them from further analysis. The same four experiments also appeared as outliers 
when we measured inter-rater reliability using a qualitatively different score (see section 2.4.2). 
2.4. EVALUATING THE PREDICTIONS OF HUMAN JUDGMENTS GENERATED BY SEMANTIC PROJECTION 
For each category/feature pair, we evaluated how well the ratings produced by semantic projection could recover the 
human ratings, by using two complementary measures.  
Linear correlation. We used Pearson’s moment correlation coefficient to estimate how much of the variance in hu-
man ratings across items could be predicted by variance in the ratings from the semantic projection. This measure is 
sensitive to even minor shifts in ratings: a slight change in a single item would (in most cases) affect the SD of the 
entire rating distribution and, consequently, change the contributions of all items to the correlation value. Therefore, 
it provides a rather strict test for our proposed method. Nonetheless, it is strongly biased by outliers, such that a 
strong correlation might reflect not the overall quality of semantic projection but, rather, a few extreme ratings made 
by both humans and our method. 
Pairwise order consistency. This measure, which we denote OCp, estimated the percentage of item pairs, out of all 
possible pairings, for which the difference in ratings had the same sign in both human judgments and the semantic 
projection. In other words, for every item pair (i,j) such that i was rated by humans as a having a stronger value than 
j on the feature continuum, we tested whether the semantic projection had predicted the same (vs. opposite) pattern. 
This measure is sensitive only to the direction of pairwise differences but not to their magnitude; for instance, in the 
animals/danger experiment, humans rate alligators to be more dangerous than dolphins, so we require that semantic 
projection makes the same judgment regardless of how far apart the two animals fall on the feature subspace. Here, a 
change in the rating of a single item would only affect those pairs that (a) include this item, and (b) reversed their 
difference sign as a result of this change. This measure is therefore robust to outliers. 
2.4.1. SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
The significance of both evaluation measures for each experiment (i.e., category/feature pair) was measured via a 
permutation procedure. For each of 10,000 iterations, we randomly shuffled the labels of category items in the fea-
ture subspace (but not their labels in the human data) and recomputed our two evaluation measures to obtain their 
empirical null distributions. The significance of the true correlation was computed relative to the mean and SD of its 
null distribution, estimated with a Gaussian fit. To compute the significance of the real pairwise order consistency 
measure (OCp), we counted the number of null values that exceeded it and divided this number by the total number 
of permutations. For each evaluation measure, p-values across the 52 experiments were corrected for multiple com-
parisons using False Discovery Rate correction (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001).  
2.4.2. ESTIMATING AN UPPER BOUND FOR THE EVALUATION MEASURES 
Because semantic projection approximates human knowledge, its success is limited by the amount of noise or uncer-
tainty in that knowledge. Specifically, if human ratings for a certain category/feature pair exhibit low inter-rater reli-
ability, then testing whether semantic projection captures human knowledge for this pair makes little sense, given 
that different people often disagree in their judgments. Therefore, for each experiment, we compared our first meas-
ure—linear correlation—to the reliability of ratings across participants, estimated via inter-subject correlation (IS-r; 
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see section 2.3). Specifically, we divided the squared correlation (i.e., percentage of variance in human ratings ex-
plained by semantic projection) by the squared IS-r, and took the square root of the result. We followed a similar 
procedure for computing pairwise order consistency across participants (inter-subject OCp, or IS-OCp), in order to 
obtain an upper bound for our second measure. Here, we divided the OCp from the semantic projection by the IS-
OCp. For both measures, values greater than 1 were set to 1. In the following sections, “adjustment for upper bound” 
refers to this normalization of our evaluation measures relative to inter-rater reliability of the behavioral data. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. SEMANTIC PROJECTION PREDICTS HUMAN JUDGMENTS 
For each of the 52 category/feature pairs, we tested how well the feature values of category items matched between 
human ratings and semantic projection. Figure 2 shows scatterplots of human ratings against model predictions for 
each category/feature pair. Figure 3 summarizes the distribution of the evaluation measures across all experiments, 
both before and after normalizing these measures relative to their upper bound (inter-rater reliability; section 2.4.2.). 
Overall, semantic projection successfully recovered human semantic knowledge: moderate to strong correlations in 
ratings (r>0.5) were observed for nearly half of the pairs (25/52) and, across all experiments, the median correlation 
was 0.47. Moreover, after adjusting this statistic based on inter-rater reliability in ratings (median IS-r across exper-
iments: 0.76), the “adjusted median correlation” was 0.61 (i.e., the variability in human ratings captured by semantic 
projection was 37% of the upper bound; 0.37 = 0.61). Similarly, pairwise order consistency between semantic 
projection and human ratings was higher than 50% for nearly all pairs (47/52) and, across all experiments, the medi-
an OCp was 65%. After adjusting OCp based on inter-rater reliability (median IS-OCp across experiments: 73%), the 
median increased to 90% (i.e., the pairwise order consistency in human ratings captured by semantic projection was 
90% of the upper bound). In about half of the experiments (31/52), both the correlation and OCp measures were sig-
nificant. 
However, the fit between semantic projection and human ratings varied a lot across experiments, with the best fit 
observed for ratings of names by gender (r=0.94, OCp =87%) and the worst fits observed for ratings of cities by cost 
(r=-0.15, OCp =47%) and professions by location (r=-0.12, OCp =45%) (Inter-quartile range across experiments: 
r=0.44, OCp =16%). We note that across the 52 experiments, our evaluation measures did not correlate strongly with 
their corresponding reliability measures (i.e., upper bounds). Specifically, the correlation between r and IS-r across 
these experiments was 0.22, and the correlation between OCp and IS-OCp was 0.09 (both are not significant, as indi-
cated by 5000 random permutations of experiment labels). We further consider this variability across experiments in 
the Discussion section. 
3.2. REMOVING ONE END OF A FEATURE SCALE COMPROMISES SEMANTIC PROJECTION   
In defining a feature subspace (e.g., "𝑠𝚤𝑧𝑒") for semantic projection, we relied on antonymous adjectives (e.g., 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑏𝚤𝑔) that can be intuitively thought of as defining opposite ends of a scale. The arithmetic difference be-
tween the antonymous word vectors situates this scale within the GloVe space, i.e., it defines a “diagnostic” direc-
tion in the space along which concrete objects show high variation with regard to the feature in question. However, 
this subtraction might not be necessary if the diagnostic information were already sufficiently represented by each 
adjective vector on its own. In other words, the word-vector 𝑏𝚤𝑔  might already define a size-related  
diagnostic direction in GloVe space, such that subtracting 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 from it is redundant (this would be possible if, e.g., 
these antonyms lay on opposite sides of the GloVe origin). To test whether one end of a feature scale was sufficient 
for predicting human common knowledge, we repeated all experiments but this time compared behavioral ratings to 
(i) semantic projection on the end that represented “more” of a feature (e.g., the average of 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,  𝑏𝚤𝑔, ℎ𝑢𝑔𝑒  for 
“size”); and, separately, (ii) semantic projection on the end that represented “less” of a feature (e.g., 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,  𝑙𝚤𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒, 𝑡𝚤𝑛𝑦  for “size”). 
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Figure 2: Semantic projection predicts human judgments across various categories and features. 
For each of 52 category/feature pairs, scatterplots show the relationship between z-scores of aver-
age item ratings across participants (y-axis) and ratings predicted by semantic projection (x-axis). 
Correlation and pairwise order consistency value are presented below each scatterplot. Experi-
ments for which both of these measures were significant are shown over a white background. 
Straight lines are linear regression fits to the data and, across figures, vary according to correlation 
strength from black (weak) to blue (strong). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of evaluation scores for semantic projection. Histograms across 52 catego-
ry/feature pairs are presented for linear correlations (left) and pairwise order consistency (right) 
between semantic projection ratings and human judgments, before (blue) and after (red) adjust-
ment for inter-participant reliability in ratings. Dashed lines denote medians. 
Across the 52 experiments, projections on the former (“more”) end had a median correlation of r=0.18 with human 
ratings, and projections on the latter (“less”) end had a median correlation of r=0; both projection schemes per-
formed worse than our original semantic projection (p<10-6, d=0.75 and p<10-8, d=0.99, respectively) which, as re-
ported above, had a median correlation of r=0.47 with human ratings. Similar patterns emerged for the other evalua-
tion score, namely, pairwise order consistency: across experiments, the two alternative projection schemes had me-
dian values of OCp=58% and OCp=50%, both worse than our original semantic projection (p<10-4, d=0.58 and p<10-
7, d=0.86, respectively), which had a median value of OCp=66%. Performance was even worse when, instead of us-
ing projection, we computed the distance between each item in a category and either end of the feature scale, using 
either cosine or Euclidean distance. Therefore, the difference between the vectors of antonymous adjectives—rather 
than either vector in isolation—provides feature-specific “diagnostic” dimension in GloVe space (see also Kozima 
and Ito, 1995). 
3.3. SEMANTIC PROJECTION IS SUCCESSFUL EVEN WITHOUT OUTLIER ITEMS 
One potential concern that arose during our analysis was that the correlation between human ratings and semantic 
projection might have resulted from few outliers that were rated as having extreme feature values by both humans 
and our method. For instance, when rating animals by size, semantic projection might be able to predict that whales 
are very big while mice are very small based on word co-occurrence statistics: the words “big”, “large” or “huge” 
(which define one end of the size subspace) might co-occur with some frequency around “whale”, whereas the 
words “small”, “little” or “tiny” (which define the other end of the size subspace) might co-occur with some fre-
quency around “mouse”. Such extreme items could cause a strong fit between semantic projection and human rat-
ings even if, for most animals with less extreme values, semantic projection cannot recover human knowledge. 
However, we do not believe this to be the case, because semantic projection showed high pairwise order consistency 
with human ratings, and this measure is not strongly biased by outliers.  
Still, in order to address this concern more directly, we repeated our analyses for each of the 31 significant experi-
ments after removing the item that received the most extreme average rating, as measured by the absolute value of 
its z-score across items; then, we removed the next most extreme item, repeated the analyses, and continued this 
process until 10 items (i.e., 20% of the 50-item categories) had been removed. The results of this analysis are pre-
sented in Figure 4. As extreme items were gradually removed from the dataset, both evaluation measures somewhat 
decreased: across experiments, the median initial correlation of 0.62 decreased to 0.50 after removing the 10 most 
extreme items. Similarly, the median initial OCp of 73%, decreased to 66%. However, removing extreme items also 
resulted in less reliable human ratings (reflecting relatively higher noise or uncertainty for less extreme items): 
across experiments, the median IS-r decreased from 0.80 to 0.66, and the median IS-OCp decreased from 75% to 
69%. 
To test whether our evaluation measures were more severely affected by the removal of extreme items, compared to 
the inter-participant reliability measures, we carried out a mixed-effects linear regression to predict the values of 
both measures based on: (i) the number of removed items; (ii) the type of measure (raw vs. upper-bound approxima-
tion); and (iii) the interaction between (i) and (ii). Random intercepts by category and by feature were included. For 
both correlation and OCp, the interaction term did not significantly improve the model (modeling r and IS-r: 
χ2(1)=0.10, p=0.75; modeling OCp and IS-OCp: χ2(1)=0.22, p=0.64), indicating that the decrease in the evaluation 
measures was indistinguishable from the decrease in the corresponding inter-participant reliability. Therefore, ex-
treme feature values bias the success of semantic projection only to the same extent that they increase certainty, or 
reduce noise, in semantic knowledge itself (as reflected by increased reliability of human judgments). 
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Figure 4: Semantic projection is not biased by outliers. r (left) and OCp (right) values are plotted 
as a function of the number of items with the most extreme human ratings that were removed for 
the data. Data from each of 31 category/feature pairs (those with significant results in our main 
experiment) are depicted in color, varying by feature. Black continuous lines show the average 
across the 31 pairs. Black dotted lines show the average inter-rater reliability across the 31 pairs. 
4. DISCUSSION  
Our findings demonstrate that semantic projection of concrete nouns can approximate human ratings of the corre-
sponding entities along multiple, distinct feature continuums. The method we introduce is simple, yet robust, suc-
cessfully predicting human judgments across a range of everyday object categories and semantic features. These 
results suggest that semantic knowledge about context-dependent similarities is implicitly represented in the struc-
ture of word embedding spaces. Thus, the conceptual knowledge that can be constructed bottom-up from word co-
occurrence statistics is significantly more flexible and rich than has been previously assumed. 
The nature of semantic knowledge representations has been long debated, and continues to be central to the study of 
the human mind in cognitive science, neuroscience and philosophy (Jackendoff, 1992; Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; 
Fodor, 1998; Laurence and Margolis, 1999; Barsalou, 2008; Lambon-Ralph and Patterson, 2008; Mahon and 
Caramazza, 2008; Binder et al., 2009; Markman, 2013; Yee et al., 2014; Margolis and Laurence, 2015; Mahon and 
Hickok, 2016). In particular, knowledge about the relationships between object categories and the features character-
izing them has been traditionally discussed in the context of symbolic representations such as feature lists (Rosch 
and Mervis, 1975; Smith and Medin, 1981), structured schemata (Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977), or highly elaborate 
intuitive theories (Gopnik et al., 1997; Gopnik, 2003) (for an early example of modeling context-dependent 
similarities, see Medin and Schaffer, 1978). Prior studies that have attempted to extract such knowledge from natural 
corpora have had to augment the tracking of word co-occurrences with more elaborate information such as depend-
ency parses or supervised identification of particular linguistic patterns (Poesio and Almuhareb, 2005; Barbu, 2008; 
Baroni and Lenci, 2009; Baroni et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2014; Rubinstein et al., 2015). Our results therefore chal-
lenge these approaches by suggesting that the distributional, sub-symbolic representational format of word embed-
dings can support the flexible re-structuring of object categories to reflect specific features. Moreover, given that 
these spaces are hypothesized to approximate lexical semantics, the current study suggests that complex feature-
specific knowledge is part of a word’s meaning. 
In addition to demonstrating that word meanings may integrate knowledge that had been independently acquired 
through non-linguistic (e.g., perceptual) experience, our findings provide a proof-of-principle that such knowledge 
can be independently acquired from statistical regularities in natural language itself. In other words, the current 
study is consistent with the intriguing hypothesis that, like word embedding spaces, humans can use language as a 
gateway to acquiring conceptual knowledge (Rumelhart, 1979; Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Elman, 2004, 2009; 
Lupyan and Bergen, 2016). Indeed, humans are sensitive to patterns of word co-occurrence, and use them during 
language processing (McDonald and Ramscar, 2001; Ellis and Simpson-Vlach, 2009; Frank and Thompson, 2012; 
Monsalve et al., 2012; Smith and Levy, 2013; Willems et al., 2015) (for tracking of relationships between words and 
linguistic contexts more generally, see, e.g., Clifton et al., 1984; MacDonald et al., 1994; Trueswell et al., 1994; 
Garnsey et al., 1997; Hale, 2001; Traxler et al., 2002; Gennari and MacDonald, 2008; Levy, 2008). In addition, evi-
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dence from congenitally blind individuals suggests that such patterns are indeed sufficient for acquiring some forms 
of perceptual knowledge, e.g., similarities between colors or actions involving motion, and subtle distinctions be-
tween sight-verbs such as “look”, “see” and “glance” (Marmor, 1978; Shepard and Cooper, 1992; Noppeney et al., 
2003; Landau et al., 2009; Bedny et al., 2011). Thus, in the absence of direct, perceptual experience, language itself 
can serve as a source of semantic knowledge. 
What kinds of category/feature relations could be acquired in this manner? Past research has suggested word em-
bedding spaces (prior to any semantic projection) capture gross knowledge about the sensory modalities associated 
with different objects (Louwerse and Connell, 2011), but they fare relatively poorly in approximating detailed per-
ceptual properties in comparison to abstract (e.g., encyclopedic or functional) knowledge (Baroni and Lenci, 2008; 
Andrews et al., 2009; Baroni et al., 2010; Riordan and Jones, 2011; Hill et al., 2016). The current results suggest a 
more nuanced view (see Figure 2): first, knowledge about some perceptual features (e.g., size) was successfully 
predicted for some categories (animals, mythological creatures). Second, whereas some abstract features (e.g., gen-
der, danger) could be recovered via semantic projection across all the categories with which they were paired, other 
abstract features (e.g., intelligence) were only recovered for some categories but not others. The factors underlying 
the performance patterns of semantic projection across different feature/category pairs (and across different entities 
within a category) may, therefore, be a fruitful area of future investigation. For instance, a recent study has reported 
a correspondence between implicit social biases and the knowledge available in word embeddings (Caliskan et al., 
2017). 
Notwithstanding this variability in performance, we emphasize that semantic projection exhibits promising generali-
zability across animate and inanimate categories (e.g., animals vs. clothing), natural and man-made categories (e.g., 
weather vs. mythological creatures), and common and proper nouns (e.g., professions vs. cities). We are excited to 
further test how well this method can recover knowledge about entities that are abstract rather than concrete, as well 
as knowledge about concepts that correspond to parts of speech other than nouns (e.g., projecting verbs on adverb-
subspaces). Similarly, our method generalizes across different “kinds” of features: from those that are judged to be 
relatively binary (e.g., the wetness of animals) to those that vary more continuously between two extremes (e.g., the 
gender associated with articles of clothing). It may further extend to other kinds of features such as those with mul-
tiple, discrete values (e.g., “number of legs”) and, more generally, to complex types of context-dependent 
knowledge represented in semantic subspaces with more than one dimension. 
These prospects for generalizability raise deeper questions about semantic knowledge representations in word em-
beddings: which set of word-vectors are considered to constitute psychologically plausible categories (Murphy, 
2004)? Which semantic subspaces represent features (or, more generally, contexts; Clark, 1973; Binder et al., 
2016)? Which categories can be meaningfully described with which features (e.g., Barsalou and Sewell, 1985; 
Tanaka and Taylor, 1991)? And what geometric operations besides than linear projection could predict different 
kinds of human knowledge? Addressing these questions could help characterize the structure of word embedding 
spaces and, critically, inform more general theories of categories and features that are fundamental to the study of 
concepts. Specifically, if word embeddings are found to implicitly represent information that approximates human 
patterns of category formation, feature elicitation, and context-dependent semantic judgments, then their structure 
could perhaps provide a principled way for deriving an ontology of concepts. 
In conclusion, semantic projection in word embeddings is a powerful method for estimating human knowledge 
about the structure of categories under distinct contexts. Within the distributional semantics literature, our method 
continues the tradition of applying simple linear algebraic operations to perform useful semantic comparisons in 
word embeddings (e.g., vector subtraction, cosine similarities, matrix multiplication; Baroni and Zamparelli, 2010; 
Mikolov et al., 2013). Moreover, compared to prior attempts at extracting semantic knowledge from patterns of nat-
ural language use, this method requires significantly less human supervision and/or corpora annotation. Most im-
portantly, it obviates the need to define a-priori a constrained ontology of semantic features that would span the 
vector space: given an existing word embedding, semantic projection can flexibly recover a variety of semantic fea-
tures. Therefore, we believe that we have only scratched the surface of the total volume of knowledge implicit in 
word embeddings. We hope that semantic projection will provide a useful, generalizable framework for deeper ex-
ploration of such models. 
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APPENDIX: CATEGORY ITEMS AND FEATURE DEFINITIONS 
1. CATEGORY ITEMS 
1.1. Animals (n=34) 
Alligator, Ant, Bee, Bird, Butterfly, Camel, Cheetah, Chicken, Chipmunk, Crow, Dog, Dolphin, Duck, Elephant, 
Goldfish, Hamster, Hawk, Horse, Mammoth, Monkey, Moose, Mosquito, Mouse, Orca, Penguin, Pig, Rhino, Salm-
on, Seal, Snake, Swordfish, Tiger, Turtle, Whale 
1.2. Cities (n=50) 
Amsterdam, Atlanta, Baghdad, Bangkok, Barcelona, Beijing, Berlin, Boston, Cairo, Chicago, Dallas, Delhi, Detroit, 
Dubai, Hong-Kong, Honolulu, Houston, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Karachi, Kiev, Lahore, London, 
Los-Angeles, Madrid, Mexico, Miami, Milan, Montreal, Moscow, Mumbai, Nairobi, New-York, Paris, Philadelphia, 
Prague, Rome, San-Francisco, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Taipei, Tehran, Tokyo, Toronto, Venice, Vienna, War-
saw 
1.3. Clothing (n=50) 
Bathrobe, Belt, Bikini, Blouse, Boots, Bra, Bracelet, Coat, Collar, Cuff, Dress, Earrings, Glasses, Gloves, Gown, 
Hat, Jacket, Jeans, Knickers, Loafers, Necklace, Nightgown, Overcoat, Pajamas, Panties, Pants, Pantyhose, Rain-
coat, Robe, Sandals, Scarf, Shawl, Shirt, Shorts, Skirt, Sleeve, Slippers, Sneakers, Socks, Stockings, Sweater, 
Sweatshirt, Swimsuit, Thong, Tiara, Tights, Trousers, Tuxedo, Vest, Watch 
1.4. Mythological creatures (n=50) 
Alien, Angel, Banshee, Bigfoot, Centaur, Chimera, Cyclops, Demon, Devil, Dragon, Dwarf, Elf, Fairy, Faun, Genie, 
Ghost, Ghoul, Gnome, Goblin, God, Golem, Gorgon, Gremlin, Griffin, Harpy, Hydra, Imp, Leprechaun, Leviathan, 
Manticore, Mermaid, Minotaur, Nymph, Ogre, Pegasus, Phoenix, Poltergeist, Sphinx, Succubus, Thunderbird, Titan, 
Troll, Unicorn, Vampire, Warlock, Werewolf, Witch, Wizard, Wraith, Zombie 
1.5. First names (n=50) 
Anthony, Ashley, Avery, Barbara, Betty, Carol, Casey, Charles, Christopher, Daniel, David, Donald, Donna, Doro-
thy, Elizabeth, George, Jackie, Jaime, James, Jennifer, Jessica, Jessie, Jody, John, Joseph, Karen, Kendall, Kenneth, 
Kerry, Kimberly, Linda, Lisa, Margaret, Mark, Mary, Matthew, Michael, Nancy, Patricia, Paul, Peyton, Richard, 
Riley, Robert, Sandra, Sarah, Steven, Susan, Thomas, William 
1.6. Professions (n=49) 
Actor, Actress, Artist, Attorney, Babysitter, Boss, Businessman, Businesswoman, Carpenter, Chef, Coach, Cop, 
Dancer, Detective, Doctor, Driver, Firefighter, Fool, Gardener, Guard, Housekeeper, Janitor, Judge, King, Lawyer, 
Librarian, Lieutenant, Maid, Mailman, Manager, Mechanic, Nurse, Pilot, President, Prince, Princess, Prisoner, Pro-
fessor, Psychiatrist, Queen, Secretary, Sheriff, Soldier, Student, Teacher, Thief, Waiter, Waitress, Writer 
1.7. Sports (n=50) 
Aerobics, Archery, Badminton, Baseball, Basketball, Boxing, Canoeing, Cheerleading, Curling, Cycling, Dancing, 
Diving, Fencing, Fishing, Football, Golf, Gymnastics, Handball, Hiking, Hockey, Hunting, Jogging, Karate, 
Kayaking, Lacrosse, Marathon, Ping-Pong, Racing, Racquetball, Rollerblading, Rowing, Rugby, Running, Sailing, 
Skateboarding, Skiing, Skydiving, Sledding, Snorkeling, Snowboarding, Soccer, Softball, Sumo, Surfing, Swim-
ming, Tennis, Volleyball, Weightlifting, Windsurfing, Wrestling 
1.8. US states (n=50) 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New-Hampshire, New-Jersey, New-Mexico, New-York, North-
Dakota, North-Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode-Island, South-Carolina, South-Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West-Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
1.9. Weather phenomena (n=37) 
Blizzard, Breeze, Cloud, Cyclone, Dew, Drizzle, Drought, Earthquake, Flood, Flurry, Fog, Frost, Hail, Heatwave, 
Humidity, Hurricane, Lightning, Mist, Monsoon, Rain, Rainbow, Sandstorm, Sleet, Smog, Snow, Squalls, Storm, 
Sunshine, Thunder, Thunderstorm, Tides, Tornado, Tsunami, Twister, Typhoon, Whirlwind, Wind 
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2. FEATURE DEFINITIONS 
Age:  {old, ancient, elderly} ↔  {young, youth, child}   
         
Arousal:  {interesting, exciting, fun}  ↔  {boring, unexciting, dull} 
         
Cost:  {expensive, costly, fancy} ↔ {inexpensive, cheap, budget}   
         
Danger:  {dangerous, deadly, threatening} ↔  {safe, harmless, calm} 
         
Gender:  {male, masculine, man} ↔  {female, feminine, woman}   
         
Intelligence:  {intelligent, smart, wise} ↔  {stupid, dumb, idiotic} 
         
Location:  {indoor, indoors, inside} ↔  {outdoor, outdoors, outside}   
         
Loudness:  {loud, deafening, noisy} ↔  {soft, silent, quiet} 
         
Political:  {democrat, liberal, progressive} ↔  {republican, conservative, redneck}  
         
Religiosity:  {religious, spiritual, orthodox} ↔  {atheist, secular, agnostic} 
         
Size:  {large, big, huge} ↔  {small, little, tiny}    
         
Speed:  {fast, speedy, quick} ↔ {slow, sluggish, gradual} 
         
Temperature: {hot, warm, tropical} ↔ {cold, cool, frigid}    
         
Valence:  {good, great, happy} ↔  {bad, awful, sad} 
          
Wealth:  {rich, wealthy, privileged} ↔  {poor, poverty, underprivileged}  
         
Weight:  {heavy, fat, thick} ↔  {light, skinny, thin} 
         
Wetness:  {wet, water, ocean} ↔  {dry, country, land}    
         
 
